TOP SECRET

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I. THE COMMUNIST BLOC

Congo: Seven planeloads of Congolese Army soldiers reportedly have been flown to an unspecified location in Equateur Province following reports that Gizenga troops have entered the province. A UN spokesman in Leopoldville has confirmed that concentrations of these troops have been observed near the border between Orientale and Equateur provinces. Mobutu's attempted airlift could lead to clashes with the UAR battalion of the UN contingent, which controls several of the airfields in Equateur Province.

Ambassador Timberlake states that he is skeptical concerning Mobutu's ability to arrest the present military trend in favor of the Gizenga forces. The American Consulate in Elisabethville has characterized Europeans there as despondent and Africans as tense; rumors of increasing anti-white and anti-Tshombe sentiment are prevalent.

II. ASIA-AFRICA

*Laos: Flights by bloc IL-14s into Laos continue. Most of these flights now appear to be going to the Xieng Khouang area, where several IL-14s recently have been observed on the ground. [Laotian T-6 aircraft have now flown several missions, apparently without spotting bloc aircraft. They are reported, however, to have attacked ground targets.]

The bloc has no fighter aircraft in North Vietnam, but there are perhaps five YAK-18 trainers in North Vietnam which might be used if the bloc decides to counter the T-6 threat to its IL-14 supply sorties into Laos. Recently, they have been reflected in flight schedules for training flights.

Souvanna Phouma planned to seek Prince Sihanouk's permission to invite
Pathet Lao leader Phoumi Vongvichit to Phnom Penh for consultations. The purpose of this invitation is undisclosed, but other reports indicate Souvanna feels that he still retains enough influence to mediate the conflict between the right and the left in Laos.

Turkey: A new crisis may be developing within the Turkish Government. Turkey's top military commanders are reported to feel that the popularity of the military has decreased alarmingly during recent weeks because of the lack of reforms, high prices, and the political trials of leaders of the old regime. If conditions do not improve, the military commanders reportedly intend to dissolve the Committee of National Union (CNU) and arrest all members except General Gursel. Awareness of this potential threat may explain the urgency with which the CNU organized the new Constituent Assembly, as well as the appointment of the former ground forces chief as minister of defense and the selection of a former chief of the General Staff as president of the House of Representatives.

III. THE WEST

Bolivia-Czechoslovakia: Czech Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajek is to visit Bolivia at the invitation of President Paz for a six-day period beginning next week. According to a Bolivian Government spokesman, Hajek is authorized to make a definitive offer of Czech installation of an antimony smelter in Bolivia. The Bolivian Government has been under heavy pressure since last fall to respond to Soviet overtures relating to a tin smelter.

Guatemala: President Ydigoras told the American ambassador on 10 January that he has discovered a conspiracy among senior army officers and is sending a number of them...

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to posts abroad. The ambassador comments that he has never seen Ydigoras appear so harassed. Such dissension is known to exist among the military forces, and the opposition parties are actively seeking to exploit it. Leaders of the underground Communist party are reported to be planning "an intense effort" to take over a post-Ydigoras government, "as the Communists did in Cuba." Although the threat to Ydigoras is serious, he is a skillful manipulator and has already coaxed and bribed one party out of the three-party opposition coalition formed last month.

IV. SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE REPORTS AND ESTIMATES

(Available during the preceding week)

Main Elements in the Congo Situation: Shifting Fortunes of Mobutu-Kasavubu and Lumumba Forces; Basic Problems Including Role of the Army; Relations with African States, Belgium, the Bloc, and UN; and Prospects.
Reports from Leopoldville indicate that Gizenga troops, following their push into Katanga, have entered Equateur Province as well. Seven planeloads of Congolese Army soldiers reportedly have been flown by Mobutu to an undisclosed location in Equateur to meet the new threat. Ambassador Timberlake, however, is skeptical concerning Mobutu's ability to arrest the present military trend in favor of the dissidents.

In Equateur, the dissidents will be able to count on at least the tacit support of the UAR battalion—the only UN force in the northern part of the province—which controls at least three airfields there.

In Katanga, the UN has moved a 600-man Moroccan battalion to the northern part of the province in a move to try to prevent large-scale fighting between the dissidents and Katangan forces. According to the American Consulate in Elisabethville, Europeans there are despondent and Africans tense; there continue to be rumors of increasing anti-white as well as anti-Tshomé sentiment in the area.

President Touré of Guinea, following a visit to Yugoslavia, on 11 January requested the UN to withdraw Guinea's 750-man contingent from the Congo by 20 January.

Touré and President Tito called upon the UN to disarm Mobutu's army, to release ex-Premier Lumumba, and to restore normal governmental operations in the Congo. Touré's move appears designed to emphasize his solidarity with his host—who earlier withdrew Yugoslavia's token UN contingent—as well as to place Guinea in the forefront of those African states supporting Gizenga. The UN appears unlikely to oppose a Guinean withdrawal.
Bolivian President Invites Official Czech Visitors

Czech Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Hajek, accompanied by representatives of the foreign and commerce ministries, is to make a six-day visit to Bolivia beginning next week. President Paz invited Hajek, who is reportedly en route to the Brazilian presidential inauguration on 31 January. A government spokesman is quoted in the press as stating that Hajek is authorized to make a definitive offer of Czech installation of an antimony smelter in Bolivia. Bolivia's annual antimony production is five to six thousand metric tons.

Paz' invitation to Hajek may have been prompted in part by an interest in dramatizing Bolivia's interest in foreign economic help. Paz is seeking an emergency increase in American aid. Vice President Juan Lechin recently interrupted a trip to the United States, Europe, and Asia after a stop in Washington and returned to Bolivia in order, as a close associate of Lechin's described it, "to urge the government to make the United States implement its aid promise" before the Eisenhower administration goes out of office.

The Bolivian Government has been under heavy domestic pressure since last fall to accept bloc economic aid first suggested to a Bolivian parliamentary delegation in Moscow last July. A Soviet parliamentary delegation which visited La Paz in late December tentatively offered a credit of $150,000,000 with details of the offer to be worked out during a visit to Moscow probably in February or March of a Bolivian economic delegation.

Paz' invitation to Hajek may alternatively be designed to tighten the pressure of extremist agitation for acceptance of bloc aid by presenting an appearance of new Bolivian-bloc economic negotiations. The Paz administration appears to be close to the final stages in its negotiations for substantial economic and technical aid from sources which include the Inter-American Development Bank, the US Government, and a private West German company which has secured a federal government guarantee in Bonn. The aid is for the virtually bankrupt Bolivian Mining Corporation (Comibol). Paz believes that the rehabilitation of Comibol will provide him with a significant increase in support from the politically important miners.
Plotting Resumes in Guatemala

Plotting against the government of President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes has resumed. Dissension in the army, which led to an abortive revolt on 13 November, continues, and opposition political parties are seeking to exploit it. The President disclosed to the American ambassador on 10 January that he had discovered a conspiracy among senior army officers and that he is sending a number of them to diplomatic and consular posts abroad. In his conversation with the ambassador, Ydigoras was vitriolic against the Guatemalan congress, which has stymied his program in recent sessions, despite the fact that a majority of the deputies were Ydigoras supporters at the time of the December 1959 congressional elections. The ambassador commented that he has never seen Ydigoras so emotional and showing such visible signs of harassment.

Although the threat to the President is serious, he is a skillful political manipulator and has already coaxed and bribed one party to leave the three-party opposition "unity pact" concluded early last month. He now is applying his divide-and-rule tactics against the leftist, non-Communist Revolutionary party, the only party in Guatemala with a degree of mass support and the President's most potent civilian adversary.

Meanwhile, members of the underground Communist party are predicting a coup attempt sometime this month. The Communists will lend only token aid to the plotters, but that once Ydigoras is overthrown the Communists will make "an intense effort" to take over the new government, "as the Communists did in Cuba."
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